Abstract: Objective. To determine if the proportion of consumers on federally qualifi ed health center (FQHC) governing boards is associated with their use of federal grant funds to provide uncompensated care. Methods. Using FQHC data from the Uniform Data System, county-level data from the Area Resource File and governing board data from FQHC grant applications, the uncompensated care an FQHC provides relative to the amount of its federal funding is modeled as a function of board and executive committee composition using fi xed-eff ects regression with FQHC and county-level controls. Results. Consumer governance does not predict how much uncompensated care an FQHC provides relative to the size of its federal grant. Rather, the proportion of an FQHC's patient-mix that is uninsured drives uncompensated care provision. Conclusions. Aside from a small executive committee eff ect, consumer governance does not infl uence FQHCs' provision of uncompensated care. More work is needed to understand the role of consumer governance.
F ederally qualifi ed health centers (FQHCs) are a critical source of primary care for approximately 20 million medically underserved people in both urban and rural areas nationwide. 1 They use income-sensitive sliding-fee scales to charge for care, but ultimately accept all patients without regard for their ability to pay. Consequently, FQHCs serve a disproportionate share of uninsured and low-income persons and provide a considerable amount of uncompensated care.
To cover the costs of providing uncompensated care, FQHCs receive federal grants from the Bureau of Primary Health Care. However, despite the cost-eff ectiveness of FQHCs, 2 these funds oft en fail to fully off set the costs of the uncompensated care they provide. In 2000, the average annual cost of care for an FQHC patient was $406, while federal funding per uninsured patient was only $226. By 2007, the average annual cost of care per patient had risen to $552, while federal funding per uninsured patient had only increased to $270, increasing the funding gap from $180 to $282. 1 Consequently, FQHCs may fi nd it increasingly diffi cult to maintain the organization's fi nances while pursuing their mission.
Faced with this challenge, there is evidence that some FQHCs adopt practices to reduce the amount of uncompensated care they provide. When patients cannot pay, some FQHCs simply write off the uncompensated care as bad debt. Others set up payment plans or use a collection agency to collect unpaid balances. Still others deny treatment and refer patients to other providers. 3 Federally qualifi ed health centers with less fi nancial slack in their budgets are more likely to adopt such practices, but it is unclear what factors determine how FQHCs decide how much uncompensated care they can aff ord to provide. 4, 5 One potential factor in these decisions is the FQHC's governing board, which is required to consist of at least 51% FQHC consumers. 4 CHCs provide care toents at m pay, and the provision of enabling services designed to increase access to heal For decades, it has been assumed that consumer governance makes FQHCs more responsive to their community's needs. [6] [7] [8] Indeed, the concept of representation suggests that there is a positive association between descriptive representation (i.e., representatives sharing salient characteristics with those they represent) and substantive representation (i.e., representatives advocating for the interests of those they represent). [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] Accordingly, assuming that uncompensated care is in the interest of most FQHC patients, the proportion of consumers on the board should be positively associated with the amount of uncompensated care an FQHC provides, depending of course on the extent to which those board members resemble the typical low-income, uninsured FQHC patient.
While several studies have identifi ed barriers to the eff ective implementation of consumer governance, none of these studies have empirically evaluated the relationship between board composition and organizational outcomes. [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] Thus, this study sought to determine the relationship between the proportion of consumers on the board and the FQHC's provision of uncompensated care relative to the amount of its federal grant. Informed by the link between descriptive and substantive representation, we hypothesized that boards with a greater proportion of representative consumer members will help sustain a mission towards the uninsured (as measured by the provision of uncompensated care) that would be absent-or signifi cantly diminished-in boards with proportionally fewer consumers.
Methods
Data sources. Data on FQHCs were drawn from years 2002-2007 of the Uniform Data System (UDS), which is collected annually by the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) and reports aggregate patient demographics and organizational staffi ng, service provision, and fi nances. Aft er 2004, HRSA stopped releasing select fi nancial variables for individual FQHCs, which they deemed proprietary. However, complete UDS data through 2007 were obtained for this study through a data use agreement with the George Washington University aft er intervention by Congressman Henry Waxman.
The Health Resources and Services Administration also compiles data from numerous sources to create the Area Resource File (ARF). The ARF contains county-level measures of both health care supply and population demographics. Select variables describing the characteristics of the counties in which FQHCs were located from six years of ARF data between 2002 and 2007 were merged with the UDS data to serve as controls.
Using UDS identifi cation numbers, descriptions of board members from years 2003-2006 of FQHC grant applications were merged with the UDS/ARF dataset. These data, obtained by a Freedom of Information Act request, contain information on board members' names, consumer status, board tenure, board offi ce held, and occupation. Board member data were collapsed to the FQHC level yielding the percentage of board members who were: 1. non-consumers, 2. non-representative consumers (whose socioeconomic status does not resemble that of the typical FQHC patient), and 3. representative consumers (whose socioeconomic status resembles that of the typical FQHC patient). The methods for categorizing FQHC board members into these three groups are described elsewhere.
Exclusion criteria and missing data. The FQHC program includes Community Health Centers (CHCs), Migrant Health Centers, Health Care For The Homeless Programs, Public Housing Health Centers, and School-Based Health Centers. Federally qualifi ed health centers that are not CHCs (i.e., do not receive CHC grant funds) are eligible to request a waiver of the consumer governance requirement. 22 Such waivereligible FQHCs were excluded from this study, while CHC grantees with other FQHC funding remained in the sample and were fl agged to indicate additional funding sources. The analysis was limited to fully-operational federally-funded FQHCs by further excluding centers without at least one full-time medical provider, at least one full-time administrative staff person, and at least 5,000 annual patient encounters. 23 Federally qualifi ed health centers in the U.S. Territories were also excluded.
Using these criteria, 907 unique FQHCs were included in the target sample. The data covered 4,716 FQHC-Years; from a starting population of 5,668 FQHC-Years; 952 FQHC-Year observations were excluded using the criteria of full operations and board presence. Data were not available for all of the sampled FQHCs, and, as Table 1 shows, the sample is limited to the 71.4% of included FQHCs for which grant application data were available.
An analysis of the excluded FQHCs using publicly available data indicated that the fi nal sample was generally representative, although FQHCs missing data were likely to be more fi nancially effi cient, have lower costs relative to revenues, and derive a greater share of their revenue from grant funding. Missing data were not a concern in the ARF or the UDS. According to HRSA, blank entries in the UDS are not missing and should be considered synonymous with zero. Therefore, all "missing" values in the UDS data were recoded accordingly.
Analysis. Using these data, each FQHC's uncompensated care ratio is modeled as a function of board composition, executive committee composition, the interaction between them, general time trends, and other FQHC-level and county-level factors, and is represented by Y in the equation:
where i identifi es the FQHC and t=1, . . ., T indicates the year between 2004 and 2007. Consumer is a matrix containing the categorical measure of the proportion of the board consisting of representative consumers, non-representative consumers, and non-consumers (reference group). Offi ce is a matrix of two variables indicating the number of (a) representative and (b) non-representative consumer board members on the executive committee. Consumer*Offi ce is a matrix containing a total of four interaction terms between the variables represented by Consumer and Offi ce. W is a matrix of FQHC-level and county-level controls, T is a matrix of binary year indicator variables, μ is a matrix of FQHC-level fi xed eff ects, and ε represents the unobserved time-varying error. Because a delay is expected between board composition at any given time and measurable outcomes resulting from the board's decision-making, the board composition variables are lagged by one year.
The uncompensated care ratio is calculated by summing the amount of an FQHC's bad debt and sliding fee discounts and dividing these uncompensated care costs by the total amount of federal FQHC grant funding the center received in the same year. This measure, constructed from UDS data, is used by HRSA to ensure that FQHCs are using grant funds appropriately to provide care to the uninsured. 24 The model also controls for a variety of county-level and FQHC-level factors, which may infl uence FQHC decision making and the amount of uncompensated care provided. 23, 25 Prior to the fi nal analysis, a series of specifi cation tests confi rmed that a model with FQHC-level fi xed eff ects was preferred over OLS (F(816, 1354) = 10.20, p < .0001) and random eff ects (Chi2 (42) Additionally, various functional specifi cations of several included variables (physician on the board, executive committee composition, board size, and site count) were modeled, and the specifi cation with the greatest explanatory power was used in the fi nal models. Pairwise correlations between all explanatory variables revealed no cases of perfect collinearity. While some variable pairs were highly correlated, the relationships observed were as expected.
Unobserved factor(s) that may have unbiased and theoretically consistent eff ects could be associated with board composition and uncompensated care provision. For example, a powerful CEO might exert infl uence on board member selection and also determine how actively the FQHC pursues payment. 28 Consequently, board composition and board size may be endogenous. One approach is to use an instrumental variable to conduct two-stage least squares (2SLS). However, identifying an instrument that is both strong and valid can be diffi cult, especially with panel data, where the instrument must predict variation over time. Several potential instruments were identifi ed, and their strength was determined in a series of fi rst stage regressions. None of the potential instruments were strong enough to use, especially given the problems presented by weak instruments. 29 Therefore, the 2SLS approach was abandoned. Lastly, while board composition is assumed to determine organizational performance, organizational performance may determine board composition. [30] [31] [32] This issue was tested using a cross-lagged regression technique [31] [32] [33] to estimate the composition of the board in year 2 as a function of the uncompensated care ratio in year 1. The results, estimated using fi xed eff ects models with FQHC-level robust clustered standard errors, suggested that the uncompensated care ratio does not predict board composition.
Results
The descriptive statistics for the sample appear in Table 2 . During the study period, an average FQHC grantee had a staff of just over 100 employees working at one of six delivery sites, saw almost 16,000 patients and nearly 62,000 encounters annually. Of these, 70% were either uninsured or enrolled in Medicaid, almost half (48%) had asthma, diabetes, or hypertension and nearly half (49%) had incomes below poverty. Over the four year period, the average FQHC had an uncompensated care ratio of 1.08, indicating that it was providing an amount of uncompensated care equal to 108% of its federal grant. The average increased from 0.93 in 2003 to 1.12 in 2006, suggesting that over time the amount of uncompensated care FQHCs are providing is increasing at a faster rate than the size of their federal grants.
The results of the model to predict the uncompensated care ratio appear in Table 3 . An uncompensated care ratio of 1 indicates that an FQHC provides an amount of uncompensated care exactly equal to the amount of its federal grant. It follows that a ratio below 1 is indicative of an FQHC using some portion of its federal grant for purposes other than providing uncompensated care, while a ratio greater than 1 indicates that an FQHC provides more uncompensated care than its federal grant can cover.
Contrary to the hypothesis, neither the proportion of representative (F(3, 818)=0.85, p = .466) nor the proportion of non-representative consumers (F(3, 818)=0.74, p =.527) on the board is signifi cantly associated with the amount of uncompensated care an FQHC provides. However, the construct for the number of non-representative consumers on the executive committee is jointly signifi cant (F(3, 818)=2.90, p = .0343). At mean values of representative and non-representative representation, each additional non-representative consumer on the executive committee is associated with an 0.02 unit increase in the uncompensated care ratio. For the average FQHC, this represents a 1.9% increase. In addition, a few signifi cant variables were identifi ed, which suggest that the growth Federally qualifi ed health centers that receive a public housing grant have an uncompensated care ratio 0.74 units lower than that of CHC-only grantees. Thus, if a CHConly grantee spent every dollar of its grant on uncompensated care, a public housing grantee would only be expected to spend 26 cents of every dollar on uncompensated care, all else being equal. The total number of annual encounters is positively associated with the uncompensated care ratio. Each additional 100,000 annual encounters is associated with an 0.77 increase in the uncompensated care ratio. While such an increase in patient encounters is likely only relevant for the largest FQHCs, relative to a break-even point of 1, this is a very large eff ect.
The proportion of FQHC patients who are age 65 or older is negatively associated with the uncompensated care ratio. Each 10 percentage point increase in this age group is associated with an 0.24 unit decrease in the uncompensated care ratio. While the coeffi cient on Medicare was not statistically signifi cant, the coeffi cient on the proportion of patients age 65 and above most likely refl ects the universal coverage provided to all U.S. citizens through the Medicare program, especially considering that the proportion of patients uninsured is positively associated with the uncompensated care ratio. Each 10 percentage point increase in the proportion of patients without insurance is associated with an increase of 0.13 in the uncompensated care ratio.
Discussion
Despite facing enormous challenges, FQHCs have managed to provide primary care to some of the most vulnerable populations in the most underserved areas of the United States. For the last fi ve decades, they have exemplifi ed what it means to be core safety net providers, maintaining an open-door policy while relying on extremely limited resources. Largely due to this history of success, the Aff ordable Care Act (ACA) invests heavily in FQHCs, providing $11 billion in new funding over fi ve years, permanently authorizing the program, and enlisting FQHCs to help train the next generation of the primary care workforce. The authors of the ACA also expect a signifi cant return on their investment. FQHCs are being counted upon to meet the increased demand arising from the expansion of insurance coverage to tens of millions of Americans, as well as to continue providing uncompensated care to both the undocumented population not benefi ted by reform and those for whom non-fi nancial barriers to access will remain even aft er the ACA is fully implemented.
Yet, this study clearly indicates that FQHC grant funding is not keeping pace with the amount of uncompensated care FQHCs are providing, as evidenced by the increase in the uncompensated care ratio from 2003 to 2006. While funding increases under the Aff ordable Care Act or subsequent budgets may temporarily reverse this trend, a more long-term solution is needed to target federal funds to organizations providing the most uncompensated care. Other safety net providers contend that they are able to serve vulnerable populations just as eff ectively as FQHCs without being governed by consumers and the results of this study strongly suggest that consumer governance has very little eff ect on the amount of uncompensated care an FQHC provides relative to the amount of its federal grant. Therefore, it is not clear whether federal funds for the provision of uncompensated care should be restricted to organizations with consumer majority governing boards.
The consumer governance provision is not the sole distinction between FQHCs and other safety net providers. Indeed, there are many substantial diff erences between FQHCs and other safety net facilities in the pursuit of their mission. For example, while FQHCs have a legally mandated option to treat all regardless of ability to pay, hospital-based ambulatory clinics face no such mandate, in many cases shielding them from the brunt of uncompensated care, even as they enjoy the advantage of tax-exempt non-profi t status. It is for this reason that Congress has proposed setting a mandatory minimum level of charity care provision, which hospitals must provide to retain their non-profi t status. 34 Similarly, because of the exceedingly high number of uninsured patients they serve, FQHCs have far less of an ability to cost-shift than providers that enjoy a more diverse payer mix.
Given the number of individuals who rely on the health care safety net and the disproportionate fi nancial burden safety net providers shoulder, the decision of how to allocate limited fi nancial resources should be based on sound empirical research rather than untested assumptions. Federal funds should be targeted to safety-net organizations that provide the most uncompensated care and grantees should be required to demonstrate that they provide an amount of uncompensated care that meets or exceeds the amount of their grant. With many FQHCs providing uncompensated care in excess of their federal grant award, FQHCs that consistently provides less uncompensated care than provided for by their federal grant should face the possibility of having their funding reduced if they cannot justify the discrepancy, and these funds should be reallocated to FQHCs in need of additional funding.
Limitations. This study has several limitations. First, the UDS data used here are self-reported and unaudited. 35 There is no way to assess the accuracy of the UDS data, but they remain the only comprehensive data available on FQHCs.
Second, grant application data were not received for all FQHCs. While systematic diff erences between missing and non-missing data were minimal, this may limit the ability to generalize the results of this study to settings other than those described by the sample. Third, while county-level factors are controlled for using ARF data, the county and the FQHC's service area are not necessarily synonymous. For smaller FQHCs with a single delivery site, the service area may be only a portion of a county. For large, multi-site FQHCs, the service area may span multiple counties or cross state lines. Consequently, some county-level factors aff ecting delivery sites lying outside the grantee's county may not be controlled for in the study. To the extent that those factors are time-invariant, the fi xed eff ects models will control for them. Still, time-varying factors may persist and future studies should consider alternative ways to account for the diversity of settings in which large FQHCs with multiple delivery sites operate.
Finally, consumer governance may have less of an eff ect than expected for two reasons. First, it may be that the community's needs are widely known. Assuming everyone knows that uninsured patients need uncompensated care, then including consumers on the board adds nothing to identifying the community's needs. [36] [37] [38] Second, the law sets a high threshold at 51%. If the presence of one or two consumers on the board is suffi cient to make the board responsive to the community, then any variation above 51% will be of no added value. Ultimately, what we would like to know is how much, if at all, the amount of uncompensated care provided by an FQHC would decrease if they were not governed by consumer majorities. A study similar to this one, comparing FQHCs to other safety net providers without consumer governance (e.g., free clinics, hospital emergency rooms, etc.) could determine whether a nominal level of consumer governance matters suffi ciently.
Conclusion. Looking to the future, many questions remain to be answered about how to eff ectively integrate FQHCs into the broader health care system in the wake of the Aff ordable Care Act, which increases FQHC funding and expects the program to play a critical role in meeting the increased demand from tens of millions of newly insured Americans. Moreover, even with increased insurance coverage, demand for uncompensated care will remain, and FQHCs are expected to continue meeting that demand. The results of this study show that beyond the consumer majority, increased levels of consumer governance have little eff ect on how much of its federal grant funds an FQHC uses to provide uncompensated care. However, more work is needed to understand how FQHCs allocate their federal grant funds. Case studies of FQHCs willing to submit to a fi nancial audit could help to answer this question, although poorly performing FQHCs would be unlikely to participate.
Federally qualifi ed health centers that provide the most uncompensated care should be targeted for the receipt of additional federal funding, and if other providers without consumer governing boards can accurately document the level of uncompensated care they provide, Congress should consider allowing them to compete with FQHCs for federal grant funding. This does not mean, however, that the consumer governance requirement for FQHCs should be eliminated, as it may be benefi cial in other ways. For example, prior work has demonstrated that consumer governance is positively associated with the provision of enabling services that help underserved patients get access to care. Similarly, by incorporating the experiences of patients at the center, consumer governance may also play an important role in assessing the quality of care an FQHC provides. As health care systems in the U.S. and abroad grapple with the notion of how best to inform patients and involve them in diff erent levels of health care decision making, identifying tangible benefi ts of consumer governance is an important area for future study.
